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ABSTRACT This article constructs a model of three types, or clusters, of
Muslim insurgency over the past two centuries. It analyses how each cluster
shares a common ideological formulation, impetus, leadership type, propensity
for violence, organisational structure and level of durability. Examples from
each of the three clusters are briefly examined and compared on these criteria.
The article then examines Iraq’s insurgency (more correctly, insurgencies)
from mid-2003 to the present in light of the models to suggest how the
insurgency ‘fits in’ with other insurgencies in the Muslim world. Understanding
its characteristics in light of the models sheds light on how durable the
insurgency may be. The most durable insurgencies have been ones in which the
mantles of nation and Islam are successfully fused.
The US has found itself in a position where it cannot stay and it cannot leave
Iraq. (Kofi Annan, UN Secretary General, September 2006)
Kofi Annan’s comment succinctly captures the USA’s predicament nearly
four years into Iraq’s insurgency. Keeping a large occupation force in Iraq
helps fuel the insurgency at a high price in blood and treasure, but an early
exit fuels fears of civil war and chaos—and the possible formation of a
‘Sunnistan’ that could serve as a base for al-Qaida and other violent actors.
Continued occupation further sullies the USA’s poor reputation in the
Muslim world, while leaving behind a broken Iraq would no doubt sully it
even further. No good choices are available. While the war and insurgency
have cost Iraq dearly—tens (perhaps hundreds) of thousands dead,
enormous physical and economic devastation—they have also cost the
USA.1 In addition to over 3000 dead soldiers, the final economic cost of the
Iraq war for the USA is expected to reach between $1 trillion and $2 trillion.2
If nothing else, this trend clearly underlines the growing use of the term the
‘Long War’ by the US Secretary of Defense and other members of the Bush
administration.
The Iraq insurgency was predictable—and, indeed, was predicted by many
analysts—as a distinct possible outcome of the invasion. Even the US State
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Department’s own Iraq study group warned of this potentiality before the
war began.3 Given this prescience, given the knowledge that insurgency was a
real possibility, why have counterinsurgency measures failed so miserably?
The easy answer, which is largely true, points to the breathtaking
incompetence of the Pentagon in planning for and administering the post-
war occupation.4 However, this is not the whole story. A more historically
informed view would suggest not only that an insurgency was virtually
inevitable, but also that it would probably be durable and persistent. For the
past two centuries that has been the consistent story of Muslim insurgencies
that have been prompted by foreign occupation.
The introduction of European power—both soft and hard—in the Muslim
world has spawned numerous types of Islamist rebellion since Napoleon’s
troops invaded Egypt in 1798. Hard power, in the form of military conquest,
has elicited certain forms of Islamist response. Economic, social and political
influence, or soft power, has generated an even greater range of responses,
from internal reform movements generated by social change, to violent
attacks on the state when social change has been paired with state weakening.
This is not to suggest that all forms of Islamist (and other) protest are a by-
product of Western hegemony, but rather that Western hegemony has always
produced an Islamist response.
The purpose of this article is twofold: to provide a conceptual – historical
framework with which to understand the range of Islamist responses to
foreign domination, and then to understand Iraq’s insurgency through this
framework. I present a typology of different ‘clusters’ of Islamism that the
Muslim world has experienced over the past two centuries (see Table 1). Each
of three main clusters of Islamism has quite different characteristics, which
are fleshed out below. I then examine the Iraqi insurgency following the
March 2003 US invasion of Iraq. More accurately, I focus on the insur-
gencies that developed, and how they have shifted over time. The point of
this exercise is to suggest a broader historical understanding of the Iraqi case.
I argue that the broad characteristics of the Iraq case strongly indicate that
the insurgency is durable and will probably be persistent for the duration of
the US occupation.
Cluster 1: Islamism as resistance
Foreign domination, and especially non-Muslim domination, of Muslim
lands over the past two centuries has routinely generated a violent Islamist
response. European conquest of Muslim lands in the 19th century gave rise to
violent resistance that was sustained for years, although with mixed military
success. France’s occupation of Algeria in 1830 prompted a nearly immediate
armed rebellion that lasted, with interruption, until 1847. Led by the famed
‘Abd al-Qadir, the Algerian insurgency at one point controlled two-thirds of
Algeria, including the outskirts of the capital city, Algiers, functioning as a
state in the territory it controlled.5 Algerian resistance to French domination
continued periodically until its war for independence in 1954 – 62.
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The French were not alone in this regard. British military occupation of
Egypt in 1882 prompted an armed resistance, known as the ‘Urabi revolt.
This was the first of a series of resistance campaigns by Egyptians aimed at
ending foreign occupation. The Free Officers coup in 1952, followed by the
Suez campaign in 1956, culminated seven decades of sporadic anti-British
militancy. Similarly, the expansion of British military power (via Egypt)
into the Sudan led directly to the Mahdiyya movement, a puritanical and
xenophobic resistance led by Muhammad ibn Abdullah, a self-proclaimed
Mahdi. The revolt lasted from 1863 to 1899 and has been made famous in the
West through the death of General Gordon, and through the re-conquest of
the Sudan by Lord Kitchener.
The story is repeated again and again: the French occupation of Syria
generating a sustained rebellion in the 1920s, the same for the Italians in
Libya, and for the British in Mesopotamia. Russia’s 19th century expansion
into the largely Muslim Caucasus region likewise spawned a series of Islamist
resistance movements, most notably the Shamil rebellion from 1834 to1858.
European colonial expansion inevitably sparked armed indigenous resis-
tance, which often took on Islamist symbols and vocabulary. The insur-
gencies lasted, with varying intensity, for years and sometimes decades.
Often, the insurgency would be characterised by a puritanical or xenophobic
streak, referred to as neo-Sufism by some scholars.
Modern day versions of this same type of armed resistance to non-Muslim
domination can be found in Palestine, Lebanon and Chechnya. Palestinian
resistance to Zionism and the migration of European Jews to Palestine has
been continuous since the 1920s, with periods of intense violence. The
Islamist component to Palestinian resistance has been significant, from the
leadership of Haj Amin al-Husayni, the Mufti of Jerusalem, in the 1920s and
TABLE 1. Clusters of Islamism
Characteristics
Cluster 1: Islamism as
resistance
Cluster 2: Islamism as
reform
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1930s, to the Islamic Resistance Movement, or Hamas, in the modern era.
Similarly, Hizbullah was born of Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982. The
success of Hizbullah’s armed resistance to Israel’s occupation compelled
Israel initially to retreat to the southern part of Lebanon and, ultimately, in
2000, to vacate Lebanon entirely. The 2006 war between Israel and Hizbullah
demonstrated that Hizbullah is continuing its military activities against Israel
into a third decade. Into its second decade of fighting, the post-Soviet
Muslim Chechen resistance to Russian domination has been the bloodiest of
all recent Islamist insurgencies and their suppression.
The ideological key to Cluster 1 insurgencies is their ability to merge
nationalist and Islamic symbols and discourse into an overarching ideology
that can successfully ‘frame’ the domination in a way that unites broad
swaths of the population in opposition. Typically the creation of such a
merged ideology has not been terribly difficult. Foreign domination has been
achieved at the point of a gun, and naturally generates its antithesis. The task
of insurgent leaders is to convince the general population that resistance
serves both Islamic and national principles. Shaykh Hassan Nasrallah, leader
of Hizbullah and a member of the Shi’i clergy, regularly mixes nationalist and
Islamic themes in his public pronouncements. I quote at length a ‘victory
speech’ Nasrallah gave in front of over one million Lebanese following the
short war with Israel. The speech typifies the sort of populist ideological
statements common to Cluster 1 insurgencies:
Our victory is not the victory of a party or a community; rather it is a victory
for true Lebanon, the true Lebanese people, and every free person in the world.
Do not contain it in party, sectarian, communal, or regional clans. The
Lebanese resistance provided strong proof to all Arab and Islamic armies. Arab
armies and peoples are not only able to liberate Gaza and the West Bank and
East Jerusalem; they are simply capable of regaining Palestine from sea to river
by one small decision and with some determination. The problem is that when
one is torn between two choices and is asked to choose between his people and
his throne, he chooses his throne. When he is asked to choose between
Jerusalem and his throne, he chooses his throne. When he is asked to choose
between the dignity of his homeland and his throne, he chooses his throne.
What is distinct about the resistance movements in Lebanon and Palestine is
that they choose the dignity of their people, holy places, and freedom and offer
their leaders, sons, and dear ones as sacrifices to join the throne of God
Almighty. We announce from this place, with the blood of our martyrs, that
any talk in Lebanon about partition is an Israeli talk, any talk in Lebanon
about federalism is Israeli talk, and any talk in Lebanon about cantons is Israeli
talk. We the Lebanese, our fate, decision, and wish to God should be to live
together in one state. We are against its partition and division. We are against
its federalism and division into cantons. What will protect Lebanese unity is a
strong, capable, and just state. What will protect Lebanon’s sovereignty from
Zionist greed is a strong, capable, and just state. What will tackle social and
livelihood crises for the Lebanese and the residents in Lebanon is a strong,
capable, just, clean and proud state. This is what we all aspire to. A strong and
capable state means a state that can proudly regain every inch of its occupied
territory and protect every drop of water from the al-Wazzani River to the
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al-Litani River and al-Hasbani River; that can stop the enemy from en-
croaching on its sovereignty daily; and that can assure its people that it is truly
protecting them with arms, power, reason, unity, organization, planning, and
national will. As for tears, they do not protect anyone. We want a strong,
capable, just, clear, and independent state that rejects any foreign trusteeship or
hegemony; a noble and proud state that does not succumb to any humiliating
terms; and a clean state where there is no room for theft or waste. This is the
state that we need. The Resistance will not end while Israel is still occupying our
land, violating our honor, undermining our security, and plundering our waters
and resources. Never! I swear to God.6
Hamas leaders undertake the same merging of nationalist and Islamic
symbols in framing their struggles against both Israeli domination and Fatah
political primacy. According to their ideology, a purely secular nationalism is
a false nationalism, but an Islamism that ignores the nation is futile. In this
way Hamas is able to appeal to both its core constituency and Palestinian
nationalists who view Fatah and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO)
as having ‘sold out’ to Israel.7
Cluster 1 Islamist movements always employ at least episodic violence,
often extensively. As foreign domination typically comes via coercive means,
the response has usually been in the mould of classic insurgency. As a matter
of survival, operational insurgent leadership is almost always constituted as a
cell system in which any one insurgent cadre can only identify a small number
of other insurgents. With a secretive and diffused operation leadership in
place, the occupying power finds it difficult to ‘roll-up’ the insurgent leaders,
and usually has to settle for eliminating one cell at a time. The division of
labour between operational and political leadership is likewise a typical
characteristic. Hamas’s political leadership clearly has broad control over the
operational cadres (the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades), as demonstrated
by its ability to impose a ceasefire, but it is also fairly clear that the
political leadership leaves the tactical and operational decisions in the hands
of the Brigades after a permissive decision to undertake violent acts has
been taken. Hizbullah practises the same division of labour. Both the
Sunni and the Sadrist insurgencies in Iraq appear to emulate this same
practice.
The political leadership of Cluster 1 Islamist movements typically comes
from a broad cross-section of society. It will include leaders from ‘traditional’
social sectors, including the ulama, and from ‘modern’ sectors as well. As
foreign domination offends across sectors, all sectors typically contribute to
the resistance. Hamas, Hizbullah and Chechnya all typify this ‘all-hands’
leadership. Much of Hamas’s funding has come from the traditional business
class in Palestine, and the titular founder of Hamas, the late Shaykh Ahmad
Yassin, was a trained cleric. At the same time, most of Hamas’s political
leaders are lay Islamists with technical backgrounds (Abd al-Aziz Rantisi,
also assassinated by Israel, was a trained medical doctor, as is Mahmud al-
Zahhar; Ismail Abu Shanab was a civil engineer before Israel assassinated
him). Hizbullah is led by a cleric, Shaykh Hassan Nasrallah, but most of the
rest of the Hizbullah leadership have technical educational backgrounds.
THE BATTLE FOR IRAQ
265
The diversity of the all-hands leadership from both traditional and modern
sectors is unique to Cluster 1 Islamism.
What is most unique about Cluster 1 Islamist insurgencies is their
durability and persistence. Typically it takes decades to put them down, if
ever. Even counterinsurgency success can prove short-lived as circumstances
change and a new generation of Islamist nationalists arises. Even with
enormous military advantages, 19th century European colonisers usually
needed two decades to suppress Cluster 1 insurgencies. Israel wins virtually
every tactical encounter, but has had little strategic success in defeating
Palestinian resistance, even after eight decades. Chechnya shows every
indication of being an enduring problem for Russia.
Cluster 2: Islamism as reform
The most common form of Islamism, by far, is the usually non-violent
political Islamism led by middle class urban merchants and intellectuals.
Virtually every country with a Muslim majority population has a political
party or organisation that typifies Cluster 2 Islamism. In many countries,
that organization is the Muslim Brotherhood. Founded in 1928 by the
Egyptian school teacher, Hasan al-Banna, the Muslim Brotherhood
organisation or its local equivalent can be found throughout the Muslim
world. As a general rule, the more democratic a political system, the more
likely the Muslim Brotherhood will be a mainstream, non-violent organisa-
tion; the more closed a political system, the more likely they will take
up arms.
Cluster 2 Islamism is a function of broad social change brought on by the
creation of mass society in the Muslim world in the 19th and 20th centuries.
Massive urbanisation, rapid population growth, expanding education,
increasing integration into the international political economy, and the
growing complexity of Muslim society contributed broadly to social
alienation, to a sense that modern society has lost something intrinsically
Islamic. The expression of this alienation by urban intellectuals did not
constitute a call to go backwards in history, but rather it was an attempt to
create a sense of compatibility of modernity and Islam. Politics, economics
and society should all have characteristics that are identifiably Muslim, even
while benefiting from the fruits of European modernity.
The 19th and early 20th century precursors to Hasan al-Banna and other
Muslim Brothers included famous reformers such as Jamal al-Din al-
Afghani, Muhammad ‘Abdu and Rashid Rida. For each of these reformers
the central philosophical and political task was to properly marry modernity
and Islam, where neither is subsumed to the other, and both are seen as
complements to the other. Indeed, it is no overstatement to suggest that the
proper structuring of Islam and modernity has been the central philosophical
theme of Muslim reformers since the middle of the 19th century.
As Cluster 2 Islamism is reformist in orientation, not revolutionary,
violence only rarely emanates from this quarter, and typically only after a
period of radicalisation in a closed polity where other forms of redress are
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impossible. For example, the Muslim Brethren in Syria radicalised following
Syria’s 1976 intervention in Lebanon on behalf of Lebanon’s Christian
community, leading to a low-intensity conflict with the ‘heretical’ Alawi
regime in Damascus. The brewing civil war was dramatically cut short with
the 1982 pulverisation of the Brethren-controlled city of Hama. Today, while
still illegal, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood has returned to its traditional
reformist orientation. After a period of radicalisation and sporadic violence
under Nasser’s regime, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood organisation has
likewise practised reformist politics for the past three decades. Jordan’s
Muslim Brotherhood organisation has been a pillar of establishment politics
since it was established in Amman 60 years ago.
The leadership and organisational structures of Cluster 2 Islamist groups
reflect the reformist nature of their ideology. Because middle class urban
intellectuals and merchants form the backbone of Cluster 2 Islamist groups,
leaders come from both traditional and modern sectors of society.
Traditional merchants (as distinct from parasitic state bourgeoisies) typically
have strong familial and social ties to the ‘ulama, or clergy. Respect for
clerical knowledge and position from this more traditional segment of
Brethren-type Islamism is typical, although clerics are rarely at the very top
of Cluster 2 Islamism. Leadership also comes from urban teachers and
professionals who typically favour lay Islamist leadership. The point is that
Cluster 2 Islamism has an open, all-hands type leadership structure in which
political entrepreneurs may come equally from traditional and modern
sectors of society. This is true whether such Islamism is constituted as a
political party, social organisation or social movement.
Cluster 2 Islamism is even more persistent than Cluster 1. Once begun,
every Muslim country will continue to have Cluster 2 Islamism indefinitely.
However, the intensity of Cluster 2 Islamism typically ebbs and flows over
time. It is responsive to political conditions at the time. During periods of
intense Arab nationalism, for example, this form of Islamism often
weakened. In the 1970s and 1980s, conversely, Islamist reformers enjoyed a
heyday of support throughout the Muslim world.
Cluster 3: Islamism as revolution
Cluster 3 Islamism is revolutionary in nature, and is a by-product both of
broad social change (as with the reformers) and state weakening. These
revolutionaries see an opportunity to grab state power, and employ generally
intense violence in order to do so. Most local jihad groups share Cluster 3
characteristics. For example, the various jihad groups in Egypt that began
forming in the 1970s fall into this category, including Tanzim al-Jihad (also
known as Takfir w’al-Higra) and al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, or the Islamic
group. These jihadi groups have launched a number of high-profile violent
attacks, including the assassination of Anwar Sadat and the murder of
dozens of foreign tourists at Luxor. Their aim was the overthrow of the
Egyptian state and the violent imposition of an Islamic state, at least as they
defined it.
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The Armed Islamic Group in Algeria was responsible for truly grotesque
violence during the Algerian civil war in the 1990s. As noted, the Syrian
Muslim Brotherhood’s turn towards violence in an attempt to overthrow
the Ba’athist regime was also an example of Cluster 3 Islamism. Perhaps
the most consequential (because it succeeded) example of Cluster 3 Islamism
was the Islamic revolution in Iran, where the monarchy was over-
thrown and state power was grabbed by Islamists. Osama bin Ladin’s
al-Qaida organisation can also be defined as belonging to this particular
cluster.
As with Cluster 2, the impetus for Cluster 3 Islamism is, in part, a reaction
to broad social change that the Muslim world has undergone over the
past century. The perceived loss of Islamic authenticity in the face of a
modernity defined by Europe has generated indigenous responses to pro-
mote ‘true’ Islamic politics and society. That these responses are them-
selves quite modern constructions does not mitigate their appeal in some
quarters.
The primary characteristic that separates Cluster 3 Islamism from Cluster
2 is the propensity to use violence to grab state power. The violence, as in
Algeria, is often intense, but is typically of short duration. The period of open
violence by Cluster 3 groups rarely lasts more than a few years. Typically
states have been effective in defeating or suppressing Cluster 3 groups in a
relatively short period of time. It is somewhat ironic that states almost always
defeat such jihadi groups because their resort to violence is typically in
response to a perceived weakness in state power. Cluster 3 groups, such as the
Egyptian group that assassinated Sadat and organised a simultaneous
military coup, truly believe they will be successful in capturing state power
against a weakened ‘apostate’ regime.
On the ideological level Cluster 3 Islamist groups share a great deal with
Cluster 2 Islamists. Both seek to create an Islamic state as they define it. The
difference, an important one, concerns the appropriate strategy to achieve
that goal: from the bottom up, or the top down. Cluster 2 Islamists typically
seek broad reform at the grassroots level, and so engage in many of the social
programmes for which Islamist groups are famous. Be it clean and
inexpensive medical clinics that service the poor, educational programmes
often superior to state programmes, or social clubs that provide culturally
appropriate avenues for social intercourse, reforming Islamists seek to
Islamise society at the grassroots. High politics and state power, it is
reasoned, will follow social change in due time.
Cluster 3 Islamists view such a bottom-up approach as naı ¨ ve. They don’t
oppose such activity, but believe such grassroots initiatives hold little hope of
achieving state and societal transformation. As long as a corrupt and
apostate regime is in power, it can use the full weight of state institutions to
thwart Islamists in their goals to create an Islamic state and a more pious
Muslim society. Indeed, such regimes often like to have Islamists engaging in
social work as it keeps them out of the political arena and distracted from
issues of real power. Only by capturing state power at the top can true
Islamisation be achieved, both in the political and societal realms—or so
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Cluster 3 Islamists argue. Hence, the call for direct action—violent action—
against the state appears quite logical given such assumptions about power
and social change.
While leading members of the clergy, or ulama, often support Clusters 1
and 2 Islamism, they typically have poor relations with Cluster 3 jihadists.
Indeed, relations between the lay Islamists who lead Cluster 3 groups and the
ulama are often tense, with lay ideologues accusing the clergy of ‘selling out’
to the regime, and the ulama berating the lay ideologues for their ignorance
of Islamic history and jurisprudence. Even Ayatullah Khomeini, a rare
exception to high clergy involvement with Cluster 3 Islamism, was a marginal
figure among his peers, in large part because of his propensity to harshly
criticise his peers in the ulama for focusing on irrelevant minutiae at the
expense of high politics. Typical is the harsh criticism from al-Qaida leaders
(none of whom is a trained cleric) of the traditional clergy, whom they increa-
singly viewed during the 1990s as hypocrites and sell-outs. That disrespect
was returned by the ulama in spades.
The animosity between Cluster 3 Islamists and the ulama points up another
distinctive feature of this form of Islamism: its leadership comes predomi-
nately from modern sectors, and only rarely from traditional sectors of
society. The lay Islamist leaders are almost always educated in secular
universities, very often in technical subjects such as engineering or medicine,
and many have spent time in the West, especially in Europe. The groups they
lead and the ideologies they espouse often have a Leninist feel to them,
doubtless reflective of the leaders’ own educational experiences. While these
leaders reject such a label, their intrinsic modernity, emphasis on the role of
vanguards, embrace of revolutionary violence and rejection of traditional
authority have created a form of Islamist Leninism.
Because of their resort to violence, Cluster 3 Islamist groups typically
organise along cell-based structures that cannot easily be rolled up by state
authority. That said, their typically small size—the Iranian revolution being
the exception—does make their ultimate failure nearly inevitable.
Defining the Iraqi insurgency
Since 2003 all three forms of Islamism have clearly been in play in Iraq.
Islamist modernists who fall into Cluster 2 have been active in mainstream
Iraqi politics, including, for example, under the government of Ibrahim
Ja’fari. The al-Qaida-led violent insurgency that seemed to peak under the
leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi before his death in June 2006
represented a form of Cluster 3 Islamism. Of primary interest to this
discussion are the ongoing Sunni Arab insurgency and the periodic Sadrist
insurgency among the Shi’i urban poor led by Muqtada al-Sadr. Both
movements show clear characteristics of being forms of Cluster 1
insurgencies, but both also have clear weaknesses in merging Islamism and
nationalism across all major sectors of society. If either or both succeed in
solidifying such an ideological message, they will be virtually impossible to
defeat. If, conversely, they remain too closely associated with one ethnic or
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confessional group and are unable to from a bridge to the wider nation, then
they will remain persistent problems, but clearly vulnerable as well.
The major challenge for both groups is to win the ‘battle for the story’ in
Iraq.8 They must be able to successfully frame their insurgency as coter-
minous with a national story of saving the nation from a foreign, non-
Muslim occupier. Even with their narrow confessionalism to date, time is on
the side of those who define the story—the basic problem—as one primarily
of foreign occupation. The longer US troops remain in Iraq, the easier it will
be for these insurgencies to win the battle for the story in Iraq and therefore
to win over the fence-sitters in Iraqi society. Seen in this way, as Kofi Annan
has cogently pointed out, US decision makers are in a Catch-22. The very
presence of American troops feeds the insurgency, but their removal would
also feed the insurgency.
Statistical data paint a clear picture of a growing insurgency in Iraq.9 The
number of daily insurgent attacks has risen steadily, from about 20 per day in
late 2003 to about 50 per day in 2004 to about 70 per day in 2005 to about
100 per day in 2006. All types of violent attacks dramatically increased from
2004 to 2005, including car bombs, suicide car bombs and roadside bombs.
The lethality of the attacks has also steadily increased, with about 2500 Iraqis
dying violently every month in 2006 (and many more than that if the Johns
Hopkins study cited earlier is accurate). US forces have taken a heavy toll on
insurgents, with about 2000 insurgents being detained or killed every month
in 2005 – 06, with a gradual increase in late 2006. But, in spite of heavy
casualties inflicted on insurgents by US forces, their total numbers do not
appear to be decreasing. During the 2004 – 06 period, it was consistently
estimated that insurgents numbered around 20 000, with about 5% of those
being foreign fighters (virtually all foreign insurgents come from Algeria,
Syria, Yemen, Sudan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia).
While a parallel civil war between Sunnis and Shi’a has grown over the
past two years, the vast majority of violent attacks target US forces and their
allies, both international and Iraqi police and security forces. These are
classic targets for any insurgency. The Iraqi insurgency is operating with
broad public support. A 2006 poll found that 47% of all Iraqis approve of
violent attacks on US-led forces; 88% of Sunni Arabs support such attacks.
That same poll found an overwhelming majority of all Iraqis—88%—want a
timeline for the US withdrawal of military forces. But Iraqis do not believe
that the USA is planning such a withdrawal: 80% of all Iraqis believe the
USA plans to keep permanent military bases in Iraq. These findings were
consistent with a British government poll in 2005 that found 82% of all Iraqis
were ‘strongly opposed’ to the presence of coalition troops in Iraq.
It is likely, given the rich history of Muslim insurgency against foreign
domination, that an insurgency would inevitably have been generated in Iraq.
Nevertheless, polling suggests that in the first few months after April 2003
most Iraqis were open to viewing the USA as a liberating force. The spec-
tacular incompetence of the US occupation, especially in those early months,
turned the tide of public opinion against it. For example, in August 2003,
nearly 60% of all Iraqis expressed confidence in the Coalition Provisional
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Authority (CPA), the provisional US occupation authority; a steady decline
ensued so that, by April 2004, only eight months later, less than 10% of
Iraqis had confidence in the CPA. Iraqi civilian deaths at the hands of US
forces were also a clear contributing factor to losing the ‘battle for the story’.
Civilian deaths stayed relatively low throughout 2003 (less than 100 per
month), but skyrocketed in 2004 to about 400 deaths per month. These
deaths, mostly as part of an ill-designed counterinsurgency strategy, probably
created more insurgents than they eliminated.
The Sunni insurgency has been more consistent and deadly than either the
al-Qaida or the Sadrist insurgencies. Baghdad has been the site of by far the
most insurgent attacks, but Baghdad has been the focus for all three
insurgencies. Outside Baghdad heavily Sunni areas have seen the greatest
number of insurgent attacks, including in the greater Anbar province,
Falluja, Mosul and Ramadi. Thus, in a geographic sense, the insurgency has
been mostly limited to Sunni areas. Greater attacks in the Shi’i south in 2006
suggest a gradual widening of the insurgency.
Engaging in insurgent activity makes a great deal of sense for Sunni Arabs.
At only about 20% of Iraq’s population, Sunnis will benefit little from
democracy or even from a consociational order such as in Lebanon. They
would go from a position of primacy (as they have held in Mesopotamia
from the Ottoman Empire to the 2003) to a position of secondary or even
tertiary importance in the distribution of spoils. Threatening permanent
instability with an eye towards cutting a political deal that disproportionately
benefits the Sunni community would seem a rational strategy. The trick is to
frame what is primarily an ethnic insurgency as a fully nationalist one. In this
regard, the results have been mixed.
By contrast, the Sadrist insurgency led by Muqtada al-Sadr has been
sporadic and limited primarily to Baghdad. Shi’i insurgent activity has been
limited primarily because the Shi’a have the most to gain through
establishing some form of democratic order. Since they have 60% of the
total population, democracy would provide the Shi’a with full control over
the political system. Ayatullah Sistani and other important Shi’i leaders
understand this basic equation better, it appears, than Sadr. Muqtada al-
Sadr, a young firebrand cleric who comes from a prestigious clerical family in
Shi’i Islam, has included strands of millenarianism within his ideology. Sadr’s
forces, known as the Mahdi Army, having been compelled to retreat from
active anti-American insurgent activities by Ayatullah Sistani, have spent the
past couple of years concentrating on the ethnic cleansing of Sunnis from
mixed neighbourhoods in Baghdad. His forces remain potent, however, and
can re-engage in full-scale insurgent activity rapidly if so ordered by Sadr.
Conclusion: the battle for Iraq
The thrust of Iraq’s insurgency is thus primarily of the Cluster 1 variety. It
shares in common many of the basic traits of Muslim insurgencies against
foreign, non-Muslim domination over the past two centuries. However, what
the insurgency has had only had limited success in doing to date is creating a
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truly powerful ideological mix of nationalism and Islam. Nationalism runs
deep in Iraq, as demonstrated by the overwhelming majorities of all ethnic
groups in Iraq that want a clear timetable for the departure of foreign forces,
and by the deep scepticism regarding the intentions of the USA when it
comes to permanent military bases in Iraq.
To a large degree the Sunni insurgency was tainted by the activities of
Zarqawi’s al-Qaida group, which undertook bloody attacks against Shi’i
targets as a means to jump-start a civil war in Iraq. It is hard to sell a message
of national and Islamic unity against foreign domination when one’s allies
kill far more local Muslims than they do American GIs. Given the continuing
ethnic cleansing of Sunnis by the Mahdi Army, clearly many Shi’a are not yet
convinced by the ideological framing of the insurgency by Sunni leaders.
Herein lies the biggest weakness to date for the insurgents in winning the
battle for the story in Iraq: they have only had mixed success in convincing
Shi’a and Kurds of the dominant nationalist version of the anti-occupation
project. And the insurgents have had no success, nor have they even really
tried, to unite with other anti-foreign groups in Iraq. Far from uniting with
the Mahdi Army, a potential ally against the USA’s occupation of Iraq, the
Sunni insurgency is effectively at war with them as well.
That said, the continuing presence of US troops in Iraq will provide plenty
of ideological fodder for the insurgency from which to continue to draw
recruits. Even with its mixed record of success in the battle for Iraq, the Sunni
insurgency will probably not be defeated as long as US troops are present in
Iraq, at least if history is any judge. Conversely, the withdrawal of US troops
will doubtless plunge Iraq into full-scale civil war, with the real possibility of
a ‘wild west’ Anbar province out of the reach of government control and
playing host to a new version of al-Qaida. Such a ‘Sunnistan’ would represent
an ironic strategic disaster for the USA: instead of creating the seeds for a
democratic transformation in Iraq and the region that would diminish the
appeal of extremists, the USA would have effectively created a new haven for
terrorists and their allies. Thus it is likely that the ultimate success of the
insurgency in driving out US forces will usher in an even darker future for
Iraq, and for the world.
Notes
1 After surveying nearly 2000 houses in Iraq, Johns Hopkins University researchers concluded that about
600 000 Iraqi civilians have died violently as a result of the war through July 2006. New York Times, 11
October 2006. This figure is significantly higher than the roughly 30 000 – 50 000 dead normally cited,
including by the Brookings database on Iraq.
2 L Bilmes & JE Stiglitz, ‘The economic costs of the Iraq war: an appraisal three years after the beginning
of the conflict’, paper presented at the ASSA meetings, Boston, MA, January 2006.
3 For the full 13-volume study and related documents, see the United States Department of State, The
Future of Iraq Project, Washington, DC: US Department of State, 2006, at http://www.gwu.edu/
*nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB198/index.htm#1.
4 There is a growing literature on how the US bungled the aftermath of its overthrow of Saddam Hussain,
including TE Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, New York: Penguin, 2006; and
PW Galbraith, The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War Without End, New York:
Simon & Schuster, 2006. A more journalistic approach that reaches the same conclusions can be found
in Bob Woodward, State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006.
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5 Ironically, living in exile in Damascus in 1860 after having been imprisoned in France, ‘Abd al-Qadir
personally intervened to stave off a potential massacre of thousands of Christians, including the French
Consul, there, for which he was honoured by France.
6 The full text in English can be found at http://meastpolitics.wordpress.com/files/2006/09/speech.pdf#
search¼%22Nasrallah%20September%20speech%22.
7 For a detailed discussion of Hamas’s ideology and its cultural frames, see Glenn E Robinson, ‘Hamas as
social movement’, in Quintan Wiktorowicz (ed), Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach,
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004.
8 The phrase comes from John Arquilla. For a comprehensive discussion of the history of the struggle to
define Iraq and create a unifying national narrative for the erstwhile British mandate, see E Davis,
Memories of State: Politics, History and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq, Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 2005.
9 All data in this section come from The Brookings Institution’s invaluable Iraq Index, found at http://
www.brookings.edu/iraqindex.
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